

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
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O R 080846Z MAR 78
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 469
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 JERUSALEM 691

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 73

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, XF, US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH DAYAN MARCH 7

1. SUMMARY: WE MET WITH DAYAN THIS MORNING FOR AN HOUR AND I BRIEFED HIM AND HIS AIDES ON MY RECENT MEETINGS IN AMMAN AND CAIRO. DAYAN DID NOT REACT TO MY REPORT THAT HUSSEIN HAD RESTATED HIS FORMAL POSITION ON FULL WITHDRAWAL AND PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND NOT GIVEN ME ANYTHING ON REALISTIC TERMS UNDER WHICH HE WOULD BE READY TO ENTER TALKS. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT EGYPTIANS ARE UPSET OVER ISRAEL'S INTERPRETATIONS THAT 242 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE WEST BANK, DAYAN RATHER DISINGENUOUSLY TRIED TO SUGGEST THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT TAKEN SUCH POSITION, AT LEAST NOT FORMALLY AND OFFICIALLY. HE SAID ONLY OFFICIAL ISRAELI GOVERNMENT POSITION ON 242 WAS STATEMENT HE MADE IN THE KNESSET MARCH 6. HE SUGGESTED

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THIS PROBLEM BE DISCUSSED DURING BEGIN'S VISIT AND COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS SOME "FORMULA" COULD BE FOUND. IF DAYAN IS PREPARING THE WAY FOR BEGIN TO PULL BACK FROM HIS INTERPRETATION OF 242, WE WILL, OF COURSE, NOT WANT TO COMPLICATE HIS TASK, BUT DAYAN'S REMARK ABOUT FINDING A FORMULA SUGGESTS HE MAY PROPOSE SOME KIND OF COMPROMISE LANGUAGE. OTHER MAIN POINT OF CONVERSATION WAS QUERY BY DAYAN WHETHER SADAT IS WILLING

SERIOUSLY TO PURSUE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE WITHOUT LINKING THEM TO PROGRESS ON COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT ISSUES IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. DAYAN SAID ISRAEL WOULD BE READY IN THAT CASE TO DO SERIOUS BUSINESS IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE; IT WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD WITH DISCUSSION OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES, SHARM-EL-SHEIKH, AND SINAI SETTLEMENTS. BUT DAYAN SAID HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT SADAT FEARED ARAB CRITICISM IF HE PURSUED MILITARY COMMITTEE TALKS IN ABSENCE OF PROGRESS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. HE INDICATED HE HOPED HE WAS WRONG ON THIS AND ASKED THAT WE GET CLARIFICATION FOR HIM BY THE TIME OF BEGIN'S VISIT. END SUMMARY.

2. PARTICIPATING IN MEETING ON ISRAELI SIDE, IN ADDITION TO DAYAN, WERE EVRON, BARAK, ROSENNE, LAVIE AND RUBENSTEIN. ON OUR SIDE, WERE LEWIS, MYSELF, STERNER, KORN AND SHERMAN.

3. I BEGAN BY GIVING DAYAN A RUNDOWN ON MY TALKS IN AMMAN. I SAID I HAD DISCUSSED THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IN AMMAN AND HAD SHOWN SHARAF THE LATEST VERSIONS OF THE DRAFT BUT HAD EXPLAINED THAT THESE WERE STILL NEGOTIATING TEXTS. I SAID HUSSEIN HAD STRESSED THAT HE HOPED SADAT'S INITIATIVE WOULD SUCCEED AND THAT HE WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT DESPITE PRESSURES BEING PUT ON HIM BY THE SYRIANS. I HAD NOT PRESSED HUSSEIN FOR A COMMITMENT TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW BUT DID TRY TO GET FROM HIM A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT HE FEELS HE WOULD NEED IN ORDER TO DO SO. FROM HUSSEIN'S RESPONSE, IT WAS CLEAR THAT
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HE IS STILL CONCERNED ABOUT JORDAN'S POSITION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND WANTS TO MAINTAIN A "WAIT AND SEE" POSTURE. HUSSEIN IS NOT FORECLOSING OPTIONS BUT NEITHER IS HE MAKING DECISIONS; HE WANTS TO KNOW WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL COME OUT. I SAID HUSSEIN HAD REPEATED HIS PUBLIC POSITION CONCERNING FULL WITHDRAWAL AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS. I HAD FRANKLY TOLD HUSSEIN THAT IT WAS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT TO HAVE GUARANTEES CONCERNING THE FINAL RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE HE ENTERED INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. I HAD URGED HIM TO KEEP AN OPEN MIND REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINING THE NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME POINT. I HAD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IT IS NOT REALISTIC TO THINK OF GOING IN ONE JUMP TO A FINAL SOLUTION AND THAT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WILL BE REQUIRED. I SAID IT SEEMED CLEAR TO ME THAT THE MINIMUM THAT WOULD ATTRACT HUSSEIN INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE THE ASSURANCE THAT ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WEST BANK WERE BASED ON ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF RESOLUTION 242 TO THAT AREA.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 470
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 JERUSALEM 691

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 73

4. I SAID THAT DESPITE HUSSEIN'S RELUCTANCE TO COME FORWARD WITH IDEAS, HE MADE IT CLEAR HE WANTS TO BE KEPT INFORMED ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WITH US. I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS NOT VERY GOOD COMMUNICATION BETWEEN EGYPT AND JORDAN. NEITHER HUSSEIN NOR SADAT HAD SHOWED MUCH INTEREST IN TAKING STEPS TOWARD A BETTER DIALOGUE. I NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT KAMEL HAD MADE AN EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION, BUT WITHOUT RECEIVING MUCH SUPPORT FROM SADAT. DAYAN SAID BOTH BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN AND DAVID ROCKEFELLER, WHO HAD COME TO ISRAEL RECENTLY AFTER PREVIOUSLY STOPPING IN AMMAN, HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK. IN THE SAME TERMS, BOTH OWEN AND ROCKEFELLER HAD SAID IF ISRAEL WANTS TO HAVE ITS SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK, HOW ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS HAVING THEIR RIGHT TO SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL? DAYAN SAID HE GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT SOMEBODY IN SECRET

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AMMAN HAD GIVEN THEM THIS IDEA. DAYAN SAID HE HAD TOLD OWEN AND ROCKEFELLER THAT THAT THERE ARE MANY ARAB VILLAGES IN ISRAEL AND THAT THEIR INHABITANTS WERE ISRAELI CITIZENS. HE ASKED

IF THE IDEA OF RECIPROCATING HAD BEEN RAISED WITH ME IN AMMAN. CONTINUING, DAYAN SAID ROCKEFELLER AND OWEN HAD ALSO TOLD HIM THAT JORDAN WOULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT IT COULD NOT ENTER NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT SYRIA JOINING. THEY HAD NOT MADE IT QUITE THAT CONDITIONAL, BUT THEY WOULD SAY THAT JORDAN IS VERY CLOSE TO SYRIA NOW.

5. I SAID OWEN HAD MENTIONED TO ME, DURING OUR BREAKFAST MEETING IN JERUSALEM, THAT HE HAD FOUND THE IDEA OF RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENTS THOUGHT-PROVOKING, BUT THE ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN AMMAN EXCEPT VERY BRIEFLY BY CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, WHO SIMPLY MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY WITHOUT ELABORATING. ON DAYAN'S OTHER QUESTION, I SAID HUSSEIN HAD INDICATED CONCERN REGARDING SYRIA AND HAD SAID HIS RELATIONS WITH SYRIA WERE UNDER SOME STRAIN AS A RESULT OF HIS REFUSAL TO CRITICIZE SADAT, BUT HUSSEIN CERTAINLY DID NOT GIVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WOULD GIVE SYRIANS A VETO OVER HIS ACTIONS. DAYAN ASKED IF WE HAD SEEN ANY INDICATION IN AMMAN OF POSSIBLE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND THE PLO. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONTACTS BETWEEN THE JORDANIANS AND THE PLO BUT WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT REPORTS OF AN IMPENDING VISIT BY A PLO DELEGATION TO AMMAN WERE WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

6. BARAK ASKED IF THE JORDANIANS HAVE ANY UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE THAT JORDAN COULD PLAY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF ISRAEL'S SELF-RULE PLAN, ADDING THAT THE SELF-RULE PLAN OFFERS CONSIDERABLE ROOM FOR A JORDANIAN ROLE. BARAK SAID I HAD SAID THAT IF THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL IS ACCEPTED, JORDAN WOULD JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT WOULD THEY DO SO IF IT WERE CLEAR THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BE TO THE FORMER BORDERS? I SAID I DID
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NOT THINK THE JORDANIANS HAD MADE AN ANALYSIS OF THE SELF-RULE PLAN. THEY SIMPLY DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO IT NOW. I ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT CORRECT TO SAY THAT I HAD SAID HUSSEIN WOULD ENTER THE NEGOTIATIONS SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL REGARDING THE WEST BANK. WHAT I HAD SAID WAS THAT IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL IN REGARD TO THE WEST BANK WOULD BE A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR HUSSEIN'S ENTRY INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT I COULD NOT SAY IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF.

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 471
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMSCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 JERUSALEM 691

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 73

7. I SAID DURING MY TALKS IN CAIRO, I HAD CONVEYED TO KAMEL DAYAN'S INQUIRY ABOUT THE MEANING THAT THE EGYPTIANS ATTACH TO THE PHRASE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS," MAKING CLEAR THAT IN ASKING ABOUT THIS DAYAN HAD SAID HE WAS NOT ACCEPTING THE TERM. KAMEL HAD SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THIS. IT SEEMED EVIDENT TO ME THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD NOT REALLY THOUGHT THROUGH THE MEANING OF "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS"; FOR THEM IT IS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL PHRASE. I ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT KAMEL HAD SAID THAT AS FAR AS THE EGYPTIANS ARE CONCERNED, THE PHRASE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS" WAS NOT INTENDED TO RAISE ANY QUESTION ABOUT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO SOVEREIGN EXISTENCE OR ITS PRE-1967 WAR TERRITORY. HE HAD SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT EGYPT ACCEPTS ISRAEL WITHIN ITS 1967 BORDERS.

8. I SAID THE EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT PROVIDED US WITH A FURTHER TEXT ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, BUT WE URGED THEM TO
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THINK ABOUT THIS. KAMEL DID INDICATE THAT THERE MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER COMPROMISE ON LANGUAGE ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE, ON OTHER THAN THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH, IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT ON THE ASWAN LANGUAGE AS THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH. KAMEL DID INDICATE THERE WAS SOME LANGUAGE THAT EGYPT MIGHT BE READY TO CONCEDE IF THE ASWAN LANGUAGE WAS ACCEPTED.

9. I SAID BOTH KAMEL AND SADAT HAD MADE A POINT OF STRESSING THEIR CONCERN OVER THE GOI'S INTERPRETATION OF RESOLUTION 242 AS NOT REQUIRING WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK. DAYAN THEN INTERRUPTED TO ASK WHERE WE HAD GOTTEN THE IDEA THAT ISRAEL HAS FORMALLY TAKEN THE POSITION THAT RESOLUTION 242 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE WEST BANK? HAD THE GOI FORMALLY STATED THAT IT INTERPRETS 242 AS NOT CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL ON ALL FRONTS? I SAID THAT WAS MY IMPRESSION. DAYAN AGAIN ASKED, "HAVE WE PUT OUT ANYTHING PUBLICLY AND FORMALLY ON THIS?" AMBASSADOR LEWIS SAID DAYAN WAS PROBABLY RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FORMAL PUBLIC STATEMENT, BUT BEGIN HAD STATED IN AT LEAST THREE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM THAT 242 DOES NOT CALL FOR WITHDRAWAL ON ALL FRONTS. LEWIS ADDED THAT DAYAN HAD TOLD US THE SAME THING. IN A TONE OF MOCK INJURY, DAYAN REPLIED "SURELY NOT I." LEWIS SAID IF WE HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD THE ISRAELI POSITION, NO ONE WOULD BE HAPPIER THAN WE TO KNOW. I SAID IT WAS CLEARLY OUR IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL TOOK THE POSITION THAT 242 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE WEST BANK. THE FIRST TIME THAT THIS BECAME A SUBJECT OF DEBATE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND OURSELVES WAS DURING SECRETARY VANCE'S TRIP IN AUGUST OF LAST YEAR. THE DRAFT PRINCIPLES THAT SECRETARY VANCE BROUGHT WITH HIM TO ISRAEL INCLUDED THE PHRASE "ON ALL FRONTS." DAYAN REPLIED THAT IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY VANCE LAST AUGUST, ISRAELIS HAD SAID ONLY THAT THE US SHOULD NOT SPEAK OF WITHDRAWAL ON ALL FRONTS ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ISRAEL ITSELF HAD STATED IT WOULD NOT ACCEPT
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WITHDRAWAL ON ALL FRONTS. DAYAN SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS WHAT BEGIN MEANT WHEN HE SPOKE ABOUT THIS PROBLEM.

10. DAYAN SAID THE ISSUE OF THE APPLICABILITY OF 242 ON ALL FRONTS WAS ONE THAT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. I SAID I WAS SURE IT WOULD BE HIGH ON THE AGENDA. DAYAN SAID, "MAYBE DURING DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, WE CAN REACH A FORMULA. MEANWHILE, THE ONLY THING OFFICIAL IS WHAT I SAID YESTERDAY IN THE KNESSET." (DAYAN WAS REFERRING TO HIS ANSWER IN THE KNESSET MARCH 6 TO QUESTION CONCERNING REPORTS THAT ISRAEL HAD CANCELLED ITS RECOGNITION OF 242. DAYAN'S STATEMENT REAFFIRMS ISRAEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF 242 BUT SAYS THERE ARE VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RESOLUTION, AND IN THE GOI'S VIEW THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION BETWEEN 242 AND THE BEGIN PEACE PLAN. DAYAN'S STATEMENT DOES NOT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH QUESTION OF APPLICABILITY OF WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS OF 242 TO THE WEST BANK. SEE TEL AVIV 2997.) I SAID WE HAD HAD A TECHNICAL EXCHANGE ON THE LEGAL BACKGROUND AND NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF THIS ISSUE WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL BARAK LAST WEEK IN WHICH WE HAD MADE CLEAR OUR INTERPRETATION THAT 242 DOES APPLY TO ALL FRONTS. DAYAN REPLIED THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION CONCERNING THE US POSITION.

HOWEVER, THE CABINET HAD DECIDED TO AUTHORIZE THE PRIME MINISTER TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER IN WASHINGTON AND MEANWHILE, THE ONLY AUTHORITATIVE ISRAELI POSITION IS WHAT HE (DAYAN) HAD SAID IN THE KNESSET ON MARCH 6.

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FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 472
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 JERUSALEM 691

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 73

11. I SAID DURING MY MEETING WITH SADAT, I HAD DELIVERED THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. SADAT HAD READ IT AND COMMENTED ONLY THAT IT CONTAINED "THE SAME OLD ARGUMENTS," BUT HE DID NOT GIVE US ANY FURTHER REACTION. I SAID SADAT HAD TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD REPLY TO BEGIN, AND THAT I MIGHT HAVE A MESSAGE TO DELIVER DURING MY MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER THAT AFTERNOON. (CAIRO'S 7339 REPORTING THAT SADAT'S REPLY WOULD BE DELAYED WAS NOT RECEIVED UNTIL AFTER MEETING WITH DAYAN.) I SAID THAT SADAT HAD AGAIN TOLD ME THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO RESUMING THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS, BUT INDICATED THAT IT WOULD FIRST HAVE TO BE CLEAR THAT RESUMPTION WOULD BRING GOOD PROGRESS. SADAT HAD NOT SAID HE WAS READY TO RESUME ON A CERTAIN DATE, AND I DID NOT KNOW WHAT HIS REACTION WOULD BE IF THE ISRAELIS WERE TO PUT FORWARD A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. DAYAN ASKED WHAT SADAT HAD SAID ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TALKS. I SAID SADAT HAD ALWAYS TAKEN THE
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POSITION THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE COULD CONTINUE ITS WORK. IF THE GOI WERE TO SEND A MESSAGE SAYING THAT WEIZMAN WANTED TO COME TO CAIRO. I THOUGHT SADAT WOULD VERY LIKELY AGREE. DAYAN SAID HE HAD GOTTEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE EGYPTIANS DID NOT WANT TO HAVE FURTHER MILITARY COMMITTEE TALKS UNTIL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THE POLITICAL SIDE. THE EGYPTIANS ARE CONCERNED THAT OTHER ARABS WOULD ACCUSE THEM OF NEGOTIATING BILATERALLY WITH ISRAEL WHEN THERE IS NO PROGRESS TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. BUT, DAYAN SAID, PERHAPS I AM WRONG. IS SADAT READY TO GO ON WITH NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, AND TO DISCUSS BILATERAL EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI MATTERS, WITHOUT THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE BEING RECONVENED? I SAID THAT SADAT HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT THAT HE IS PREPARED TO HAVE THE WORK OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE CONTINUE WHILE THE WORK OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE IS CARRIED ON THROUGH US GOOD OFFICES. EVRON SAID HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD WANTED THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO RECONVENE AFTER SADAT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON; BUT THAT HADN'T HAPPENED. I SAID THE QUESTION OF MILITARY COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS HAD NOT COME UP IN MY TALKS WITH SADAT.

12. DAYAN SAID HE WONDERED IF THE US COULD GIVE ISRAEL AN ANSWER DURING BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON THE QUESTION OF CONTINUING WORK IN THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. DAYAN SAID ISRAEL WOULD BE INTERESTED IN PURSUING SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS IN THAT FRAMEWORK. THERE ARE MANY THINGS TO BE CLARIFIED; DEMILITARIZED ZONE, SHARM-EL-SHEIKH, ETC. IT WOULD BE GOOD IF HE COULD KNOW BY THE TIME HE WAS IN WASHINGTON WHETHER SUCH BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS COULD GO ON OR WHETHER SADAT WANTS TO DEFER THEM UNTIL PROGRESS IS MADE ON THE POLITICAL SIDE. HE DID NOT MEAN JUST MEETINGS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE BUT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON BILATERAL ISSUES. AMBASSADOR LEWIS SUGGESTED THAT THE ISRAELIS SIMPLY TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO SUGGEST THAT THE MILITARY

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COMMITTEE BE RECONVENED. DAYAN INDICATED RELUCTANCE TO DO SO IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF SYMMETRY BETWEEN THE STATUS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN CAIRO AND THE JERUSALEM POLITICAL COMMITTEE. LEWIS SAID IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS PREPARED TO SEE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS GO ON FOR AWHILE, EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT WANT THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE STATUS OF THE TWO COMMITTEES TO CONTINUE FOR A LONG TIME. DAYAN SAID THAT REALLY IS NOT THE QUESTION. IF SADAT IS READY TO RESUME MILITARY COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS AND DO BUSINESS THERE, AND NOT MAKE BILATERAL PROGRESS DEPENDENT

ON ISSUES RELATED TO COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, WE CAN FIND A
FORMULA TO GET AROUND THE PROBLEM OF SUSPENSION OF THE POLITICAL
COMMITTEE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 473
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 JERUSALEM 691

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FROM ATHERTON

USDEL NO 73

13. I SAID IT IS CLEAR THAT THE EGYPTIANS LOOK UPON THE BEGIN
VISIT TO WASHINGTON AS VERY IMPORTANT, AND THEY SEEM TO
BE HOLDING OFF ON OTHER THINGS UNTIL THEN. I HAD GOTTEN THE
IMPRESSION THAT KAMEL WAS DELAYING FURTHER COMMENT ON THE
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES UNTIL AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT. DAYAN
COMMENTED WRYLTY THAT THIS MUST BE THE FIRST TIME THAT THE ARABS
HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF AN ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON. I SAID THE ONLY OTHER SUBJECT I WANTED TO MENTION
IN REGARD TO MY TALKS WITH SADAT AND KAMEL WAS THEIR CONTINUING
EXTREME SENSITIVITY ON THE SETTLEMENTS QUESTION. DAYAN ASKED,
"WHAT WOULD THEY LIKE US TO DO NOW?" I SAID THE EGYPTIANS WOULD
LIKE ISRAEL TO ANNOUNCE A TOTAL FREEZE ON SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY,
INCLUDING THE WEST BANK, DAYAN ASKED. I SAID YES. DAYAN
ASKED IF IT WERE NOT CLEAR TO SADAT THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET
HAS DECIDED NOT TO ESTABLISH NEW SETTLEMENTS. I SAID I HAD
TOLD SADAT ABOUT THE LATEST ISRAELI CABINET DECISION AND HAD
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URGED HIM TO LOOK UPON IT AS A POSITIVE STEP. I WAS NOT SURE, HOWEVER, THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD ACCEPTED THIS VIEW. DAYAN SAID IF HE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY WHAT SADAT WANTS IS FOR ISRAEL TO ANNOUNCE THAT IT WILL NOT UNDERTAKE ANY MORE ACTIVITY OF ANY KIND IN REGARD TO SETTLEMENTS. I SAID THE POINT EGYPT MAKES IS THAT NEW SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY NOW, WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING ON, IS PUBLICIZED THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD AND LEAVES EGYPT OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF NEGOTIATING WITH ISRAEL WHILE ISRAEL CONTINUES TO CONSOLIDATE ITS PRESENCE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. DAYAN PONDERED THE FOREGOING FOR A MOMENT, BUT MADE NO FURTHER COMMENT.

14. COMMENT: DAYAN'S SUDDEN SHIFT ON THE ISSUE OF THE APPLICABILITY OF 242 TO ALL FRONTS CAME AS A SURPRISE. DAYAN COULD HARDLY BE SO DISINGENUOUS AS TO IMAGINE THAT HE COULD MAKE US BELIEVE THAT BEGIN AND HE HAD NEVER TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL IN 242 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE WEST BANK. BEGIN SPENT AT LEAST A HALF AN HOUR LECTURING US, IN MY MEETING WITH HIM ON FEBRUARY 21 ON WHY ISRAEL HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERPRET 242 AS NOT REQUIRING WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK, THE ISSUE HAS COME UP IN INNUMERABLE OTHER CONVERSATIONS, AND WAS, OF COURSE, THE SOLE SUBJECT OF OUR MEETING WITH BARAK LAST WEEK. BUT IF DAYAN'S PURPOSE IS TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A GRACEFUL PULLBACK BY BEGIN FROM WHAT SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICIALS MUST REALIZE IS A DANGEROUSLY EXPOSED AND EMBARRASSING POSITION, WE WOULD HAVE NO REASON TO WANT TO COMPLICATE HIS TASK. DAYAN REMARKED THAT PERHAPS SOME FORMULA COULD BE FOUND ON THIS DURING BEGIN'S WASHINGTON TALKS. IT SOUNDS AS THOUGH HE MAY BE PLANNING TO PROPOSE SOME KIND OF COMPROMISE LANGUAGE AIMED AT PUTTING AN END TO THE DEBATE BETWEEN US ON THIS ISSUE BUT WHICH AT SAME TIME WOULD HAVE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE APPLICABILITY OF 242 TO THE WEST BANK UNCLEAR.

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Message Attributes

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Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
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Draft Date: 08 mar 1978
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Decaption Note:
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Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
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Disposition History: n/a
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Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: FROM ATHERTON, EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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SAS ID: 3407318
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MEETING WITH DAYAN MARCH 7
TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, XF, US, EG, IS, (DAYAN, MOSHE), (ATHERTON, ALFRED L JR)
To: STATE CAIRO MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/75cc97cb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
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EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014